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Abstract
The detection of bank frauds is a topic which many financial sector com-
panies have invested time and resources into. However, finding patterns in
the methodologies used to commit fraud in banks is a job that primarily in-
volves intimate knowledge of customer behavior, with the idea of isolating
those transactions which do not correspond to what the client usually does.
Thus, the solutions proposed in literature tend to focus on identifying out-
liers or groups, but fail to analyse each client or forecast fraud. This paper
evaluates the implementation of a generalized linear model to detect fraud.
With this model, unlike conventional methods, we consider the heterogeneity
of customers. We not only generate a global model, but also a model for each
customer which describes the behavior of each one according to their transac-
tional history and previously detected fraudulent transactions. In particular,
a mixed logistic model is used to estimate the probability that a transaction
is fraudulent, using information that has been taken by the banking systems
in different moments of time.
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Detección de transacciones fraudulentas a través de un
Modelo Lineal Mixto Generalizado
Resumen
La detección de fraudes ha sido uno de los temas en el que muchas compañías
del sector financiero han invertido más tiempo y recursos con el fin de mitigar-
lo y de esta forma mantenerse a salvo; sin embargo, encontrar patrones dentro
de las metodologías empleadas para cometer fraude en entidades bancarias es
un trabajo que involucra ante todo conocer muy bien el comportamiento del
individuo, con la idea de finalmente hallar dentro de todas sus transacciones
aquellas que no corresponderían a lo que habitualmente éste hace. De esta
forma, las soluciones planteadas hasta la fecha, para este problema se han
trasladado únicamente a poder identificar outliers o datos atípicos dentro de
la muestra que se está analizando, lo cual no permite analizar cada individuo
de manera individual y mucho menos realizar un pronóstico de fraudes.
En este trabajo se evalúa el uso de un modelo logístico mixto para la detección
de fraudes. Este modelo, a diferencia de los métodos convencionales para de-
tección de fraudes, considera la variabilidad de las transacciones realizadas por
cada individuo; lo que permite generar no sólo un modelo global, sino también
un modelo por cada individuo que permite estimar la probabilidad de que
una transacción realizada sea fraudulenta, teniendo en cuenta su historial de
transacciones y las transacciones fraudulentas detectadas previamente.
Palabras claves: Modelo lineal generalizado, historia transaccional, fraudes
detectados, detección de outliers.
1 Introduction
Among the methodologies used for detecting fraud through magnetic strip
cards, are those used to detect patterns or anomalies, that determine a frau-
dulent action as an event which is not consistent with others, in this way it
takes using data mining tools which use statistics science, optimization and
large volumes of information. [1], since 1997 to 2008, perform a review of
the state of art about applications of data mining in financial fraud detec-
tion. They find that most common data mining techniques applied to detect
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fraud are methods of classification [2],[3],[4],[5] and clustering [6],[7],[8]. In
[9],[10] the authors review the statistical techniques used for detecting fraud.
Specifically, the most used methodology, for fraud detection through mag-
netic stripe cards, is linear discriminant analysis. Similarly, artificial neural
networks (ANN) are used for forecasting this kind of behaviour; in [7] pro-
pose an unsupervised neural network for detecting and creating criteria to
identify suspicious individual behaviours, using trends and characteristics of
individuals. Meanwhile, in [11] proposed a supervised network, using 3 hidden
layers and back-propagation algorithm to determine patterns of fraud. In [12]
makes a comparative research among an ANN, decision trees and Bayesian
networks. With decision trees, branches could gather almost every abnormal
movement, but this kind of model requires an initial analysis of the variables
to determine whether or not independent. The method that worked better was
ANN, followed by the decision tree, and finally Bayesian network. Besides,
about the variables that should be used for detecting fraud, [13] proposed a
detailed research for choosing correctly variables and methodology, they sug-
gest using amount, type (payment, check, etc..), type of market in which it
was used, channel and check mode (PIN or chip or magnetic stripe). Also they
proposed to use aggregated information from each individual in order to have
all history available, and thereby make predictions of the behaviour of each
person, and when a transaction gets an abnormal patter it will be considered
as an alert to analyse. In many cases, be an expert minimizes the work to
select a methodology and leads to create hard rules that not determine all
abnormal movements, but mostly of them; in [14] are applied different rules
for gain knowledge of patterns of individual transactions. However, as men-
tioned, this methodology involves having a vast knowledge of the individual
and the system, as they must create rules based on the history to create im-
plications that would be used as a criterion for determining whether conduct
is suspected or not (fuzzy logic).
Generally, in the literature there are proposals made for fraud detection through
magnetic stripe cards, which are based on classification and clustering tech-
niques or ANN, in which individuals are classified according to general rules.
These techniques assume that individuals have a similar variability, a common
pattern, and they do not examine individual variability for each client in their
financial transactions. This is a disadvantage and may lead to problems in the
quality of detection because not all individuals operate equal; in real life each
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individual has a unique behaviour that should be studied as such. This paper
proposes the use of a mixed logistic model to determine suspicious transac-
tions through transactional information of individuals. As well as estimating
fraud within the organization, the model determines a model for each client,
taking into account individual behaviour.
This paper is divided into five sections, first one describes an overview about
theory of linear mixed models, the second part has information about theory
of generalized linear mixed models, the mixed logistic model is considered as
a particular case, third section presents the use of mixed logistic model to
detect fraud, and finally conclusions and references are presented.
2 General Linear Model with Mixed Effects
Linear mixed models have been increasing their popularity in applied statis-
tics literature for health sciences, because they represent a powerful tool to
analyse data with repeated measures, frequently obtained in studies of this
area. The existence of repeated measurements requires special attention to
the characterization of random variation in data. In particular, it is impor-
tant to explicitly recognize two levels of variability: random variation between
measures within a particular individual (intra-individual variation) and ran-
dom variation between individuals (inter-individual variation). The linear
mixed model considers these sources of variation and can be defined by the
following two steps:
Step 1: Modelling intra-individual variation.
Suppose that for the i-th of m individuals, ni responses have been ob-
served and that a total of N =
∑m
i=1 ni data are available. Let be yi
the vector of responses for the individual i-th, which satisfies
yi = xiβ + ziα+ ei ; i = 1, 2, . . . ,m (1)
where β is a vector of parameters (p× 1) that corresponds to the fixed
effects, xi is a matrix for the i-th individual which characterizes the
systematic part of the answer; αi is a vector (k × 1) characteristic of
the i-th individual, zi is a design matrix (ni × k) and ei is the vector
of intra-individual errors. Assumes that ei ∼ Nni(0,Ri), where Ri is a
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covariance matrix intra-individual of size (ni × ni). So, from model (1):
E(yi | αi) =xiβ + ziαi
Cov(yi | αi) =Ri
Step 2: Modelling inter-individual variation.
Suppose that the vector of random effects αi is obtained from a normal
distribution with mean zero and dispersion matrix D(k×k); besides a-
ssume that αi; i = 1, . . . ,m, are mutually independent. So, under these
assumptions:
E(yi) =E[E(yi|αi)] = xiβ
Cov(yi) =E[Cov(yi|αi)] + Cov[E(yi|αi)] = Ri + ziDz′i = V i
That is, the model (1) with the above assumptions for ei and αi implies
that yi is a multivariate normal random vector of dimension ni with a
particular form of covariance matrix, it means: yi ∼ Nni(xiβ, V i). The
shape of V i implies that the model has two different components of va-
riability, the first one refers only to the variation within individuals (Ri)
and the second one refers to the variation between individuals (D).
In the adjustment process of a mixed model is common to consider
three components: the estimation of fixed effects (β), the estimation
of random effects (αi) and the estimation of covariance parameters (D
y Ri)[15]. The standard approach under the multivariate normality
assumption is to use the method of maximum likelihood (ML) and res-
tricted maximum likelihood (REML). Although Bayesian concepts are
also used to estimate αi.
The next section will present a brief introduction to generalized linear mixed
models, which are extensions of models above but now the response variable
is not continuous.
3 Generalized Linear Mixed Model
Generally, linear mixed models have been used in situations where the response
variable is continuous. However, in practice there are cases where the response
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may be a discrete variable or categorical; for example, the number of heart
attacks in a potential patient during the last year takes values as 0, 1, 2, . . .
In these cases, Generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) are used, a GLMM
is an extension of the linear mixed model where responses are correlated and
can be categorical or discrete variables [16]. To define a GLMM, two stages
need to be mentioned:
Stage 1: Select a random sample of n individuals from a population of size N .
Attach to the i-th individual an specific parameter αi.
Stage 2: According with αi, select repetitions of {yij ,xij} ; i = 1, . . . , n,j =
1, . . . , ni. Suppose that per individual, yi|αi the repetitions are statisti-
cally independent, such that:
fi(yi|αi) = exp
{
yiξi − b(ξi)
ai(φ)
+ ci(yi, φ)
}
Where b, a, c are known functions, and φ is the dispersion parameter
which may be or may be not known. ξi is associated with µi = E(yi|αi),
, which is associated with the linear predictor: ηi = αiz′i +xiβ through
a link function g(·), such that g(µi) = ηi. For this case, zi are registered
variables that represent a random effect for the i-th individual.
Models as mixed logistic model, mixed Poisson model, Probit model and
other can be obtained with different link functions.
The methodology which was proposed is based on a mixed logistic model;
the model was obtained with a sampling scheme of two stage, where yi|αi ∼
Ber(pi) is assumed i.i.d., and with pi = P (yij = 1|αi). Also, the link function
is a logit:
logit(pi) = log
(
pi
1− pi
)
= αiz
′
i + xiβ
A logistic model with random intercept is obtained if zij = 1.
P (yij = 1|αi) = exp(αi + x
′
iβ)
1 + exp(αi + x′iβ)
,
Where α1, . . . , αn are i.i.d., such that αi ∼ hα(θ).
Note that this type of model can be extended to case where
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yi|αi ∼Multinomial(p1, ..., pk). So, the model can predict the likelihood that
a subject belongs to one of the k groups. The model’s predictive ability is
assessed by comparing the observed data and the predicted data; the model
classifies individuals in each group defined by the dependent variable based
on a cut off point set for the predicted probabilities from the estimated coe-
fficients and the value taken for each explanatory variable. [17].
The interpretation of coefficients and the criteria of goodness of fit are:
i. Theoretical value and interpretation of coefficients.
The shape of the theoretical value in a logit regression is similar to va-
lues in a multiple regression, and it represents a unique relationship with
coefficients which indicate the relative weight of each predictor. The
calculation of a logit coefficient compares the probability of occurrence
of an event with the probability that it does not happen. β are mea-
sures of changes in the odds ratio [18]. In some cases, the coefficients
are logarithmic values, so they should be transformed to do a correct
interpretation of them; taking into account that a positive coefficient
increases the probability of occurrence while a negative has an opposite
effect.
ii. Model evaluation.
Logit models with random intercept, unlike linear models, are not asse-
ssed with the R2 or through the AIC coefficient, because the methods
for calculating them require a high complexity, computation time and
perhaps, in many cases, the methods cannot converge. So that, rates
and indicators are used to get an idea of model behaviour:
Misclassification rate: Refers to the probability of classifying a 0 as 1 or
vice versa.
Good classification rate: Refers to the probability of classifying a 1 as 1
or vice versa.
Specificity: Refers to the probability of classifying a 1 as 1 given that it
is 1.
Sensitivity: Refers to the probability of classifying a 0 as 0 given that it
is 0.
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4 GLMM for detecting fraud transactions
According to the literature, the use of classification and clustering techniques
have been proposed for the detection of fraud through swipe cards [2],[3],[4],[5],
[6],[7],[8],[9],[10]; but, these techniques just create a classification rule assum-
ing that all individuals have an average behaviour, so that they cannot to
estimate (on-line) the probability that a transaction is fraudulent. Also, their
theoretical development is built under the assumption that there is only one
observation for each client, so these techniques are not available to read re-
peated measures (number of observations) of each individual.
In practice, it is known that individuals perform several transactions and that
not all clients have the same pattern of behaviour; due to that, it is interesting
to apply other techniques that forecast the probability that a transaction is
fraudulent, and also consider each client as an entity whose variability be-
tween his/her transactions defines an unique profile. One of the statistical
techniques designed to measure this, is the mixed logistic model.
In this section, a mixed logistic model is performed using real data, with the
intention of showing the feasibility of this kind of model and its benefits (in
terms of model quality). As well, there is a comparison between the results
obtained and a conventional detection technique.
4.1 Sample
The methodology of fraud detection through magnetic stripe which is pro-
posed in this paper is based on a logistic mixed model with random intercept.
The data are storing into a file that consolidates daily national transactions
of clients, taking only those that correspond to payments through two se-
lected channels. With this information it is possible to identify the type of
transaction, the date, time and place where it was made. Additional to this
transactions file, there is a file with fraud detected transactions (which will be
used to construct the variable Marca) conducted through these channels, these
transactions have been detected and confirmed by the clients, thus facilitating
the process for building a supervised model such as the logistic model with
random intercept; besides, the volume of transactions is sufficient information
to develop a model per individual.
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4.2 Preliminary Analisys
Table 1: Test of Randomness of the transaction amount per client
Null Hypothesis P-Value
1
The sequence of values defined
0.982by C1 ≤ 242307, 692 and
> 242307, 692 is random
2
The sequence of values defined
0.837by C2 ≤ 121250 and
> 125250 is random
3
The sequence of values defined
0.540by C3 ≤ 49090, 909 and
> 49090, 909 is random
4
The sequence of values defined
1.0by C4 ≤ 25000 and
> 25000 is random
5
The sequence of values defined
0.248by C5 ≤ 117647, 059 and
> 117647, 059 is random
6
The sequence of values defined
0.303by C6 ≤ 46250 and
> 46250 is random
7
The sequence of values defined
0.537by C7 ≤ 100000 and
> 100000 is random
8
The sequence of values defined
0.252by C8 ≤ 130000 and
> 130000 is random
9
The sequence of values defined
0.073by C9 ≤ 141818, 182 and
> 141818, 182 is random
Due to the different measurement scales and magnitude of the values dis-
played by the variables that are going to be used as regressors, it was necessary
to perform a transformation of them (like creating categories and transforma-
tions through logarithmic functions) in order to have them at the same level
and thus improving the fit of the models.
Subsequently, because the logistic model with random intercept assumes that
the observations are independent, a test of runs was implemented; the results
obtained are shown in Table 1. Using the mean as a measure for calculating
the runs, most of the amounts of the individual transactions were categorized
as independent (random). In particular, for the client 1 were obtained 8 runs.
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4.3 Selection of variables
In the database there are two groups: that one where there are clients who
were victims of fraud during a defined time period, and another one where
there are persons who have not detected any fraudulent transactions. U-
sing these groups, the response variable is defined as y: Marca (fraudulent
transaction). Note that the observed variable is Bernoulli type. The possible
independent variables in the model initially are: identification number (ID),
type of ID, month, day and time when the transaction occurred, the device
used for made the transaction, the channel used for the transaction (channel
1 or channel 2), the name and location of the device, the type of transaction
(withdrawal, payment or transfer), the result of the transaction (successful
or not ), the transaction amount (amount), type of individual (individual or
business), date when individual is linked to the organization, monthly income
and expenses of individuals.
Subsequently, the correlation coefficients between these variables were exami-
ned. According to the results, there is a significant correlation between the
ID, type of ID and date when the individual got linked to the organization,
this relation is expected because there are people of all ages who are linked to
the bank after obtained their majority; it is also possible to find individuals,
business or foreign persons, leading to different types of Nit.
Additionally, the month of the transaction is related to the amount of the
transaction (r = 0.8; p − value < 0.05), and to the existence of fraud (r =
0.862; p − value < 0.05); this is explained by the fact that there are months
in which people must make more payments than others (start year, end of
year). In addition, according to information provided by the experts, there
are months where fraud is most evident.
Variables as day and hour of the transaction are correlated with the rest of the
variables; however the relation is not statistically significant. The relation is
produced because there are certain days of the month with most probability
to have transactions and obviously there are individuals who manage sums
higher than average people (or vice versa).
The transaction amount is related to the existence of fraud (r = 0.82; p −
value < 0.05), it is understood because there is fraud just if people withdraw
money, which is equal to say that the transaction amount is greater than 0.
Similarly, this variable depends on the transaction code (r = 0.9; p− value <
0.05) (which is linked directly to the device), so the existence of fraud is re-
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lated to the device, although it can be due to that most of detected fraud have
been made through ATMs.
The value of incoming and outgoing, are related to the amounts of the tran-
sactions (people do not spend more money than they have in their savings
accounts), and the day (in some days there are more transactions).
Moreover, when considering the variable Marca, there is a relationship be-
tween it and the month of the transaction. It has significant correlation with
variables such as day of the transaction (r = 0.93; p − value < 0.05), hour
of transaction (r = −0.96; p − value < 0.05), the transaction code and the
transaction amount.
Finally, the explanatory variables, related to the absence or presence of fraud,
are: channel, device code, transaction amount, month, day and time of the
transaction.
However, given that fraud can be categorized using variables such as the type
of device and therefore the type of transaction, they are not going to be
eliminated (represented by transaction code). While variables like: Total
Debts, Nit type, incoming, outgoing and document type are discarded to fit
the model.
4.4 Model
The proposed model considers a random intercept per individual which re-
presents the variability of each of them. This intercept is assumed to be a
random variable distributed N(0, σ2), so estimating it, generates a fraud de-
tection model per person due to the model is taking into account the variability
of each transactions per individual. However, every estimated models have in
common the coefficients associated with the rest of explanatory variables.
In this model, the value of the coefficient indicates the importance of its as-
sociated variable, for this reason, the classifications of transactions will be
calculated using the weight (coefficient) associated to each variable; a nega-
tive value decreases the probability of a fraud (Marca=1), while a positive
value means that the probability increases [19].
It was adjusted using the GLMM package of R, with a database which contains
799 fraud detected transactions and 4854 transactions in a defined period of
time. The results are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2: Fixed Coefficients
Variable Estimated Standard p-valueCoefficient error
Mes (X1) −7.00950 0.2061 0.00
Day T (X2) −0.00741 0.01399 0.0596
Hour T (X3) −0.4193 0.02438 0.00
Amount T(X4) 1.5102 0.05005 0.00
Transaction (X5) −0.08461 0.007220 0.00Code
Intercept
41.9848 3.8211 0.00(Average)
To estimate the model, some transformed variables were used to have
consistency between the weights of each variable (coefficients); but according
with the results, the variable related to the day when the transaction was
made, is not significant, however, intuitively, this variable does not have mul-
ticolineality with others because its standard deviation is not very large; so,
under supervision, this variable will be used for estimating the model.
On the other hand, the month and the amount of the transaction are the va-
riables that contribute most to the weight; however the month is the variable
that most decreases the probability, while the amount increases the probabi-
lity. The day and the code of the transaction have the lesser weight, so they
contribute less (in a negative way.) In general terms, the model fitted to the
i-th individual is
P (yij = 1|αi) = exp(αi−7.0095x1−0.0074x2−0.4193x3+1.51x4−0.085x5)1+exp(αi−7.0095x1−0.0074x2−0.4193x3+1.51x4−0.085x5) .
To specify the model for the individual i, the estimation of its intercept αi
must be considered. In the results, it is observed that for any individuals
the month of the transaction, date, time and code transaction contribute
negatively to the likelihood that the transaction be suspicious, but as increases
the amount of the transaction , the likelihood also increases. Table 3 shows
the estimated probabilities of fraud for some individuals in the database.
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Table 3: Estimating probabilities
ID Probability Month T Day T Hour T Marca Amount Channel Code T
1 0,595 1 5 20:38:46 0 12,899 C1 6,254
2 0,765 1 17 10:48:40 0 12,899 C1 6,254
3 0,557 1 25 9:35:06 0 12,899 C1 6,254
4 0,579 1 14 10:10:34 0 11,775 C2 6,263
5 0,520 1 7 17:01:02 0 10,820 C1 6,254
6 0,728 1 20 11:35:28 0 12,206 C1 6,254
7 0,779 1 29 14:06:02 0 11,918 C1 6,254
7 0,664 1 8 17:41:16 0 12,612 C1 6,254
8 0,519 1 4 15:21:40 0 12,206 C1 6,254
9 0,702 1 27 15:59:37 0 12,899 C1 6,254
10 0,903 1 28 11:35:12 0 12,899 C1 6,254
11 0,665 1 4 16:54:10 0 10,897 C2 6,263
12 0,655 1 8 7:17:02 0 10,309 C1 6,254
13 0,724 1 23 9:53:23 0 11,513 C1 6,254
14 0,744 1 4 22:35:31 0 12,899 C1 6,254
15 0,516 1 11 10:47:25 0 10,611 C2 6,263
16 0,539 1 2 11:32:43 0 12,899 C1 6,254
17 0,828 1 30 14:56:17 0 11,918 C1 6,254
18 0,821 1 30 18:23:12 0 14,508 C2 6,263
19 0,594 1 2 2:39:34 0 12,768 C2 6,263
20 0,677 1 7 16:05:42 0 12,543 C2 6,271
20 0,615 1 14 16:47:43 0 12,138 C2 6,271
21 0,833 1 9 11:15:46 0 12,899 C1 6,254
22 0,673 1 5 19:57:58 0 12,897 C2 6,263
23 0,627 1 9 9:41:40 0 12,899 C1 6,254
23 0,620 1 25 13:53:49 0 12,899 C1 6,254
24 0,851 1 3 16:49:13 0 14,064 C2 6,263
25 0,692 1 10 16:01:00 0 11,513 C1 6,254
26 0,878 1 4 9:35:02 0 12,612 C1 6,254
27 0,560 1 1 21:37:59 0 10,820 C1 6,254
28 0,846 1 22 9:36:24 0 12,206 C1 6,254
29 0,738 1 29 21:17:16 0 12,848 C1 6,254
30 0,586 1 9 18:54:59 0 11,918 C1 6,254
31 0,697 1 15 17:16:26 0 12,612 C1 6,254
32 0,685 1 21 18:25:52 0 11,513 C1 6,254
33 0,842 1 8 9:40:34 0 11,918 C1 6,254
34 0,888 1 22 6:16:33 0 12,899 C1 6,254
35 0,592 1 28 9:54:27 0 11,513 C1 6,254
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4.5 Model Evaluation
As indicated by [1], when a fraud detection model is estimated, it is necessary
to take into account the sensitivity and specificity of its classification.
Table 4: Classification of the fitted model
Real Value
0 1
Estimated Value 0 4819 381 15 784
From the information shown in Table 4, specificity, sensitivity, bad classifi-
cation rate (bcr) and good classification rate (gcr) were calculate: bcr=0.009371
gcr=0.9906 sensitivity=0.9922 specificity=0.9812 According to the literature
it is preferable to have a lower misclassification rate because it indicates that
the model has few mistakes, while the value of the rate of good classifica-
tion (gcr) close to 1 is preferred. The sensitivity measures how good are the
classifications of the model with the true positives, and specificity measures
how good are the classifications of the model with the true negatives. The
estimated model with random intercept has very good results, but it is clear
that frauds are subject to verification.
According to tests conducted with other mixed logistic models with different
combinations of variables, the model with better results in terms of gcr, bcr,
sensitivity and specificity was the proposed one in this section.
4.6 Comparison with an Artificial Neural Network
In order to evaluate the performance of a mixed logistic model in compari-
son with the traditional techniques for detecting fraud, an Artificial Neural
Network (ANN) was implemented using the variables which were utilized for
estimating de mixed logistic model; also, different network architectures were
applied. The ANN was selected because is the conventional method that has
shown better results [see [12]].In this case it was found that the ANN did not
perform as well as the mixed logistic model. The best ANN was trained using
variables like Day T, Hour T and Amount T, its rates were: gcr = 0.8587,
bcr = 0.1515, sensitivity= 0.8048 and specificity= 0.8959; while rates for the
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ANN that was trained with the same variables using in the fitted mixed lo-
gistic regression were: gcr = 0.8233, bcr = 0.1868, sensitivity= 0.7594 and
specificity= 0.8714. The weak results, obtained from the ANN, can be related
to the methodology used in the ANN because it estimated a general model
for individuals and it was not possible to obtain a model per person as it does
the logistic mixed model, that considers the different behaviours of clients.
5 Conclusions
According to the correlation analysis between variables, the found relation-
ships coincide with the information provided by the experts. In this way,
arguably that fraud is stationary, so it has to be analysed taking into account
the month, the day and the hour of the transactions. Besides, type, amount
and channel of the transaction should be used for fitting the model and for
determining patterns for different types of fraud.
The generalized linear mixed model generates favourable results; however, it
is necessary running the model for each individual as it is built with ran-
dom intercepts unique per person. This, though computationally can be a
disadvantage, within models is an advantage, as it would have a single repre-
sentation to describe the variability of each individual. But, a high volume of
historical information is required to build a profile per individual and estimate
more precise models with a high quality outputs.
As future work, it is proposed estimating the model to groups of individuals
more susceptible according to its characteristics (females, old people); on the
other hand, it is also possible to fit a more complex model, involving variables
such as type of fraud, other kind of transactions (not only financial), among
others.
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